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1 Introduction
There is a vast literature on screening. Recently, more attention has been focused on situ-
ations where agents’ utilities are non-ordered (without requiring single-crossing condition)
or when goods are multidimensional (see, the most recent and comprehensive review by
Rochet and Stole (2007)). Yet, this rich and growing literature has paid almost no atten-
tion to screening problem when the seller faces some capacity constraints, which make costs
non-separable with respect to agents and non-concave. Such problems are quite common
in real life, for at least two reasons. First, the upper limit on total production makes cost
function increasing steeply to infinity, thus making it non-concave and non-separable. For
instance, an airline can take only a limited number of passengers in a flight and this makes
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costs dependent on total number of flying passengers. Second, standardization, by limiting
the number of sizes results in economies. For instance, offering only three classes of services
(e.g., economy, business and first) may be more economical for an airline than many distinct
classes. One can find many other examples in real life where either capacity constraint or
standardization or both become important considerations in solving the screening problem.
Our examples demonstrate the theoretical complexities in dealing with these impor-
tant situations, previously ignored in the screening literature. The strong motivation to
consider such examples stems from the fact that under non-separable costs the standard
methodology used in screening literature and the related well established theoretical results
become questionable. In particular, cycles which are precluded or reducible under standard
(separable) costs worth study under non-separable costs.1 In this case, our examples show
that cycles have interesting theoretical and practical consequences, most importantly on
efficiency. The well-known “efficiency-at-the-top” result typical under all standard situa-
tions, may now be wrong, but, more surprisingly, even all packages may be distorted! This
paradoxical result inspires us to revisit Dupuit (1849), who observed that, “... third-class...
has open carriages with wooden benches... What the company is trying to do is prevent
the passengers who can pay the second-class fare from travelling third-class; it hits the
poor... to frighten the rich. And... having proved almost cruel to third-class and mean
to second-class ones, become lavish in dealing with first-class passengers. ... they give the
rich what is superfluous.” [J. Dupuit, (1849): On Tolls and Transport Charges, quoted in
Tirole (1994), p.150.]
The natural reaction of any economist, familiar with the screening literature, would be
that Dupuit’s assertion lacks theoretical support because overall inefficiency is impossible.
But, our examples generally do support Dupuit’s idea when costs are non-separable, and
cost of passengers travelling are really non-separable (however, in this particular example
overall distortion seems unrealistic for other reasons explained after Examples).
Another surprisingly result for the economists familiar with the screening literature is:
1 Cycles or curcuits that we discuss, relate to some graph structure generated by the active
(becoming equalities) incentive-comptaibility constraints at equilibrium, as explained in Section
2.
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There can be an equilibrium where all packages are distorted, even though all incentive
constraints are non-active!
The third unusual effect stemming from non-separable cost is a new kind of price dis-
crimination — not only the standard discrimination among different types of consumers,
but also discrimination within a homogeneous group of agents. Such examples calls for
adjusting not only the screening model itself, but also the notion of its equilibrium to
incorporate new situations analyzed in this paper.
2 Model and definitions
Consider the standard discrete-type screening problem. A monopolist offers a product
or service using a menu of several discrete packages of different quantities or qualities at
some fixed tariffs on take-it-or-leave-it basis and consumers self-select. Consumer types are
indexed by i ∈ In = {1, ..., n}; and mi > 0 is the frequency of type i. The consumption-
outlay bundles are (xi, ti), where xi ∈ X denotes consumer i’s consumption and X ⊂ Rl
is a consumption set (in our examples mostly X = R, which is more challenging than the
multidimensional paradoxes, also constructed by us, but not included here). Tariff ti is
monetary transfer from consumer i to the firm. For simplicity, we assume quasi-concave
utility functions ui(xi, ti) = vi(xi) + ti, where vi is “monetary valuation” of commodity,
normalized so that vi(0) = 0, with no other assumptions. The principal knows the charac-
teristics of types, but is unable to discriminate personally.
The producer’s cost function C(m,x) is of general form, which may have a special
aggregate form C(m,x) = c(
∑
imixi), where function c : R→R. Another important form
can be a generalized separable cost function C(m,x) = f0 +
∑
imic(xi), where f0 stands
for some fixed cost.
We start with the standard assumption that the producer, for whatever reasons, designs
exactly n packages assigned to consumers by planning an assignment, (x, t) = {(xi, ti)}i=1...n
and assigns only one package to each type. We also use the standard so-called “friendly-
agent” assumption (i.e., an agent prefers the principal’s choice, when having multiple
equivalent choices). Later on both of these assumptions are questioned. Such optimiza-
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tion problem of the seller is labelled here as standard assignment-optimization program or
SAOP (though the cost function is not standard), and formulated as follows.
pi(x, t) :=
n∑
i=1
miti−C(m,x1, ..., xn)→ max
(x,t)∈(Xn,Rn)
, s.t. (1)
∀i ∈ In ⇒ vi(xi) − ti ≥ vi(xk)− tk ∀k ∈ In ∪ {0} \ {i}, (2)
(x0, t0) := (0, 0).
A solution (x¯, t¯) to this problem is the (standard) equilibrium.
Package labelled #0 here means no participation by the agent, and by including this
dummy agent, all incentive-compatibility (IC) and participation constraints can be repre-
sented by equations (2).
An equilibrium can be characterized by its set of active constraints. Any active con-
straint (i, k) (i.e., constraint becoming an quality) is interpreted as “almost-envy” from
i to k and treated as the directed arc (i → k) of an almost-envy graph, where agents or
packages are represented by nodes, and constraints are shown as directed arcs, while (0) is
the “sink.” (Directed) cycle or circuit is a closed path i→ k → ...→ i.
In a package-menu (x¯, t¯), we call one of its packages (x¯i, t¯i) as socially efficient when
it maximizes the sum of this consumer’s and producer’s surpluses (joint welfare), all
other packages being fixed, i.e., x¯i ∈ argmaxzi∈X (vi(zi)−C(m, x¯1, ..., zi, ...,x¯n)). Otherwise
the package is distorted (over-sized or under-sized). The overall-efficient package-menu
(x¯, t¯) maximizes total welfare, it does not contain any distorted packages and the overall-
inefficient is the menu that does not include any undistorted (efficient) package.
Now we step aside from the above standard setting and consider an extended screening
model, which is motivated by examples below.
A package menu is a bundle of quantity-stock-tariff triples {(qk, sk, tk)}k=1,...,K ∈ Xn ×
R2n. It means that the principal chooses K ≥ n to design as many as K types of packages
and produces a stock sk ≥ 0 of each package, without a priori deciding which package goes
to which agent (though xi = qi is typical). When agents come in a random sequence, some
stock sk may run out, so the remaining agents may be forced to choose from the reduced
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menu. Such distinction between “menu” and “assignment” becomes important when cycles
appear or/and when the principal decides to partition some consumer type into subgroups
taking different packages.
These new pricing tools become quite important under capacity constraints, unlike the
standard setting. We are not outlining in detail the new relevant model and its equilibrium
notion (it is too cumbersome). Instead, our modest goal is to give some hints and ideas
through examples.
3 Overall inefficiency, cycles and type-splitting under
non-concave costs
Three examples below show three types of cycles caused by three different peculiarities,
namely by type-splitting, non-convexity and insufficient partitioning, in addition to capacity
constraint present in all the three.
[FIGURE 1]
Generic inefficient cycle under convex cost.
Example 1. Generic cycle and overall inefficiency.
Consider a homogeneous good. Cost of production is normalized to zero, but the total
feasible production is limited to 142.5 units by capacity constraint. Thus, C(xΣ) = 0 for
xΣ ≤ 142.5, C(xΣ) = ∞ for xΣ > 142.5.2
Group numbers (m1,m2,m3) and valuations of the three types are described by the
active indifference curves in Fig.1. (here z ∈ R):
m1 = 1 v1[z] = min{9z, 1.7 + 0.5z, 28− 3z} long-dashed curve
m2 = 10 v2[z] = min{0.745z, 5 + 124z, 6.12− 19z, 29− 3.1z} dotted curve
m3 = 9 v3[z] = min{4z, 2.2 + 0.38z, 5.5− 115z, 56.2− 6.4z} short-dashed curve
2 It is easy to generalize this example to positive costs and strictly increasing utilities by adding
same linear component 7x to all functions.
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If the seller cannot partition these types into subgroups (see comment after the Exam-
ple), then the optimal assignment based on SAOP is: x = (x1, x2, x3) = (17/35, 36/5, 705/91) =
(0.486, 7.2, 7.747), and t = (t1, t2, t3) = (68/35, 53/10, 907/182) = (1.943, 5.3, 4.984).
The three points are represented by thick dot, hollow dot, and rectangle respectively. So-
lution is obtained by directly solving SAOP (computer program is available from the au-
thors, together with calculations for this and other examples). Related menu is: (q, s, t) =
((17/35, 1, 68/35), (36/5, 10, 53/10), (705/91, 9, 907/182)). The total quantity sold is 64706/455 =
142.211 units (about 0.3 capacity is wasted), and the total profit is pi = 90813/910 = 99.795.
The almost-envy-graph (shown in Fig.1) is [#1 → #2 → #3 → #1, #1 → 0, #2 → 0,
#3→ 0], and it contains the envy-cycle among agents #1,#2 and #3.
It is this cycle that results in overall distortion including inefficiency at the top (of the
graph). Indeed, nobody takes the socially-efficient quantities, which are: x∗1= 7.5, x
∗
2= 7.3,
x∗3= 7.4, respectively. Graphically, this overall inefficiency means that equilibrium points
are not the peaks of the three active indifference curves.
Looking at this example in terms of extended screening model discussed above, note
that a better partitioning of agents can eliminate most of distortion as well as cycle, thus
increasing both profit and social welfare. Indeed, a more profitable pricing strategy is to
split type-3 consumers into groups, but bunch type-1 and type-2 together, by designing a
(non-optimal) contract (qˆ, s, tˆ) = ((94
91
, 1, 5898
2275
− 3
15
ε), (36
5
, 11, 53
10
− 1
15
ε), (705
91
+ ε, 8, 907
182
− 3
15
ε))
with small ε > 0 to get strict incentive compatibility among types (not groups). It results
in a feasible assignment that brings profit of pi ≈ 100.76, which is higher than from the
initial contract (q, s, t).
The SAOP screening method is inadequate here and also in similar situations for two
reasons. First, non-trivial partitioning of types can be more profitable than usual SAOP
method “one package for one type.” Paradoxically, here price discrimination is practiced to
discriminate even between identical agents, and this partitioning increases profit and total
welfare!
Second, consider the “friendly-agent” assumption, so common in screening and optimal
contracts. Usually it is justified, because the principal can approximately make the optimal
plan strictly incentive compatible by reducing tariffs, using small ε−rewards for friendship.
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But such modifications of tariffs can not solve the problem of motivating friendship under
cycle, as one can see in the example. So, implementing the initial plan (q, t) becomes
problematic, unless modifying quantities also, like in our second plan (qˆ, tˆ), to implement
the menu in dynamic game. This plan also uses the stock tool of pricing: when one package
(qˆ1, tˆ1) = (
94
91
, 5898
2275
− 3
15
ε) is bought, nobody can further buy such a package. Such tool can
enhance profit relative to SAOP “optimal” menu (so, SAOP becomes inadequate).
To comprehend dynamic implementation and its importance, consider the initial menu
(q, s, t). What happens if 9 agents of type-2 take all 9 packages assigned for type-3 before
agents of type-3 arrive? Then nine type-3 agents go away, causing a substantial profit loss
relative to the SAOP profit pi = 99.795 (see also the discussion of implementation after
Example 3). Thus SAOP-based profit (1) is not guaranteed, (2) can be improved. ||
It is worth noting that Example 1 is generic in weak sense that any small disturbances in
three typical valuations (but not in 20 individual valuations!) and in costs cannot eliminate
the cycle and inefficiency resulting from using SAOP. However, if standardization (not
modeled explicitly) forces the principal to design only three packages, one for each group,
then this example can be generic in all senses.3 Another observation is that here inefficiency
results from an unprofitable partitioning and cycle at the top, but paradoxically, a better
partitioning does not require increasing number of packages. Example 2 below differs in this
respect, and also in the nature and causes of overall inefficiency. There, overall inefficiency
results from the requirement of standardization to integer quantities, and from the capacity
constraint.
Example 2. Shadow cycle (binding-constraints cycle) and overall inefficiency, in spite
of no active IC constraints.
Suppose that only five discrete quantities of total production of a homogeneous good are
economically feasible: xsum = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5, with per-package costs normalized to zero
as C(0) = C(1) = C(2) = C(3) = C(4) = C(5) = 0 at discrete points and prohibitively
high costs otherwise. Total production is limited as xsum ≤ 26.
3 For example, a developer of a piece of land may be forced to offer only three standards: big
lots for rich people, medium-size for middle class, and small lots for poor, because all prefer to
be surrounded by the same class. Then the assumption one-package-for-one-type is an exogenous
restriction.
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There are three (m1 = 3) agents of type #1 and m2 = 4 of type #2. Their valuations
are v1(z)=min[5z− 5, 3+ z], v2(z)=min[4.2z− 4.2, 2.6z− 2, 3.8+ z, 7.72+ 0.2z]. They
also can be defined point-wise at 5 admissible quantities (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) as:
3 of #1 v1(1) = 0 v1(2) = 5.0 v1(3) = 6.0 v1(4) = 7.0 v1(5) = 8.0
4 of #2 v2(1) = 0 v2(2) = 4.2 v2(3) = 6.8 v2(4) = 7.8 v2(5) = 7.82
These points are squares and circles in Fig. 2, interpolated by lines to become v2(.)
(dashed) and v1(.) (dotted, with circles).
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[FIGURE 2]
Generic inefficient shadow-cycle under discrete cost.
Direct calculation shows that the only optimal assignment based on SAOP (shaded
points in Fig. 2) is: {(x¯1, t¯1), (x¯2, t¯2)} = {(2, 5.0), (4, 7.8)} with total production x¯sum = 22
and profit pi(x¯, t¯) = 46.2. The alternative assignments are shown by hollow points, but it is
easy to check that they cannot be included into the optimal plan due to IC constraints com-
bined with the upper bound of 26 on total production. Assignment (x¯, t¯) is strictly incentive
compatible, so it is free of “almost-envy.” Yet, both packages are inefficient in the sense that
Pareto-improvement could be possible. There are two technologically feasible incentive-
incompatible non-standard menus more efficient than (x¯, t¯): {(x˜1, s˜1, t˜1), (x˜2′ , s˜2′ , t˜2′)} =
{(2, 3, 5.0), (5, 4, 7.82)}, {(xˆ1′ , sˆ1′ , tˆ1′), (xˆ2, sˆ2, tˆ2)} = {(3, 3, 6.0), (4, 4, 7.8)}.
So, surprisingly, in spite of the menu (x¯, t¯) being envy-free, the usual efficiency-at-the-
top property does not hold for both packages. It is because the non-active constraints are
binding and constitute a shadow cycle, shown in the right panel.
SAOP with naive (standard) partitioning here results in loss of profit as in Exam-
ple 1. Indeed, if the monopolist is able to use three packages instead of two, and better
partitioning, then, unlike Example 3 below, such better partitioning and stocks can re-
solve the problems with cycle. In particular, menu {(xˆ1, sˆ1, tˆ1), (xˆ2, sˆ2, tˆ2), (xˆ1′ , sˆ1′ , tˆ1′)} =
{(2, 3, 5.0), (4, 4, 7.8), (5, 1, 8.0)} is incentive-compatible, implementable under rationing
4 Here, valuations are continous and costs are discrete, otherwise one can make costs con-
tinuous, making valuations positive only at discrete points. Some discreteness or non-convexity
and different numbers m1 6= m2 of consumers are essential for constructing such an example.
Discreteness is natural when feasible are only 1 box, 2 boxes, 3 boxes, etc.
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by stock, and more profitable than (x¯, t¯). This stock means rationing, it makes additional
profit by forcing some group of agents split into two sub-groups buying different packages,
so discriminating within one type.
However, this pricing tool fails when it is too-costly for the seller to use more than
K = 2 packages (this standardization requirement is modelled as restriction K ≤ 2). Then
the inefficient (x¯, t¯) remains the only solution. Note that this example is non-degenerate,
in the sense that slight perturbations of data do not change anything. Small perturbations
of individual consumers can make five consumer types out of two types in this example,
but this also does not matter, if standardization does restrict the number of packages K.
||
In summary, even when all packages are envy free (which is often supposed to result
in overall efficiency) they can produce a shadow-cycle and overall inefficiency, including
inefficiency at the top! Again, this effect is due to insufficient partitioning and rather
specific costs, connected with standardization.
Example 3. Non-reducible cycle at the top resulting from non-concave costs and valu-
ation.
Instead of inefficiency, this example shows that non-reducible cycle can appear because
of non-concave cost, without additional specific reasons such as standardization or insuffi-
cient partitioning of population. This cycle can bring profit loss like in Example 1 (that
show inadequacy of SAOP).
[FIGURE 3]
Non-reducible cycle for locally-similar agents and convex cost.
Suppose the aggregate cost function is of the type: C(xsum) = max{0, 3(xsum−6.5)3}.
Thus, any production less than 6.5 is costless, but it follows from below data that total
production xsum :=
∑
i xi > 7.75 is prohibitively costly. There are five buyers of 5 types
with the following valuations:5
5 As in other examples, one can add a linear component Ax to the cost function and to all
valuations to keep the essence of the example intact without requiring satiation for agents.
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v1(x1) = 4 x1−3.325 x21 (solid parabola), v2(x2) = 1.32 x2−131/360 x22 (solid parabola),
v3(x3 ) = min{5x3 ; 1 + 0.01x3 ; 12.8− 4x3 } (thin solid curve),6
v4(x4 ) = min{5x4 ; 1 + 0.01x4 ; 4− 2x4 } (dashed curve),
v5(x5) := min{2 x5 ; 1 + 0.01x5 ; 12.8− 4x5} (dotted curve).
An optimal menu with total output xsum = 98/15 ≈ 6.533333 is:
(q¯, s¯, t¯) = ((0.6, 1, 1.203), (1.8, 1, 1.197), (0.25, 1, 1.0025), (1.0, 1, 1.01), (173 /60, 1, 6173/6000))
with related assignment shown in Figure 3: (x¯1, t¯1) = (0.6, 1.203), (x¯2, t¯2) = (1.8, 1.197),
(x¯3, t¯3) = (0.25, 1.0025), (x¯4, t¯4) = (1.0, 1.01), x¯5 = 173 /60≈2.883 33, t¯5 = 6173/6000 ≈
1.0288333, resulting in a cycled envy graph: #i→ 0∀i, #4← #5← #3¿ #4.
To see that this assignment is optimal in SAOP, note that the entire consumer surplus
goes to the principal and total welfare is maximized. Indeed, the derivatives of all valu-
ations and costs are the same: v′i(x¯i) = C
′(98/15) = 0.01, which suffices for optimum in
optimization of vi(xi) − C(xi) which is joint welfare of a couple: consumer and producer.
One can also verify by trial and error that, except for permuting agents #3, #4 and #5
around the envy-cycle (that gives same profit), or for very small changes in x3, x4, and x5,
this (x¯, t¯) is essentially a unique first-best solution.
Here some sort of type-splitting is inevitable in all solutions of SAOP, i.e., different
packages should be offered to locally-similar agents #3 and #4. The same goes for couple
#4, #5. This similarity produces the envy-cycle (in Fig.3, the dash arrow shows these ties
for only one example version, while solid arrows relate to both) which is not generic.
Here cycle in itself does not bring inefficiency or direct loss of profit. However, indirect
loss stems from cycle’s influence on implementation of the principal’s optimal menu, like
in Example 1. What happens if agents #3, and #4 take packages #5 and #4 respectively,
before agent #5 comes? Then this type-5 agent goes away unserved, causing a profit loss
of $1.0288. This non-implementation problem can be resolved by making packages #3,
and #5 slightly cheaper than #4. But if we slightly modify v3(.) as v˜3(x3 ) = min{(0.95 +
(x − 1)2); 5 x3 ; 1 + 0.01x3 ; 12.8 − 4 x3 }, then optimum remains the same but cycle and
non-implementation problem cannot be resolved by any means, as one can check.
6 The cavity in v3(.) on the graph relates to some curve modification: v˜3(x3 ) =
min{v3(x3 ); 0.95 + (x− 1)2} explained later on. Optimum is the same for both versions.
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We see that cycles undermine the traditional “friendly agent” and “no-type-splitting”
assumptions, the basic assumptions of SAOP model, which becomes inadequate here.
To conclude the discussion of examples, we can explain why Dupuit’s conjecture from
Introduction seems wrong. To generate overall inefficiency, the railroad example should
have one of the specific features similar to those in our three examples, and exhibit either
almost-envy cycle, or binding-envy cycle. Instead, under single-crossing condition (SMC)
absence of cycles and efficiency at the top are guaranteed, standardly, whereas SMC seems
very realistic for passengers. Indeed, high-income travellers not only wish to pay more for
comfort, but they also wish to pay more for an additional unit of comfort.
4 No paradoxes under separable or concave cost
In contrast to previous section, we now focus on situations where the standard SAOP
model does work well. The standard literature on screening theory, assuming linear cost,
can (and does) ignore the above mentioned methodological hardships: non-reducible cycles,
non-implementation and type-splitting (partitioning). The only formal justification for such
simplified approach that we know, relates to proving reducibility of cycles in Guesnerie and
Seade (1982), generalized further in Brito et al. (1990), and in Andersson (2005) under
linear cost. Theorem 1 below extends this reducibility result to separable or concave costs,
and adds no type-splitting claim. Thus, our Theorem provides a justification for the use of
traditional SAOP assumptions (namely, friendly-agent and no-splitting) in usual situations
as well as in some new situations, thus expanding the area of SAOP application up to the
limits of its use (shown by the examples).
Theorem 1 needs two notions. When costs are separable with a fixed-cost component
f0 ≥ 0 (C(m,x) = f0+
∑n
i=1mici(xi)), the artificial per-package profit function p¯ii is defined
as:
p¯ii(x, t) := ti − c0 − ci(xi), where c0 := f0/
n∑
i=1
mi .
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For an arbitrary cost function C(.), a similar notion is introduced by linearizing C at
some given point x¯:7
p¯ii(x, t) ≡ p¯iix¯(x, t) := ti − c0 − c¯ixi , where c¯i := 1
mi
∂C(m, x¯)
∂xi
, c0 :=
C(m, x¯)−∑ni=1mic¯ix¯i∑n
i=1mi
.
This notion enables eliminating cycles from the package-graph without any loss in profit,
by using the following bunching procedure like in Guesnerie and Seade (1982).
Bunching procedure. In a feasible situation (x¯, t¯), when an agent j almost-envies
somebody i (j → i) then we can replace j-th assignment (x¯j, t¯j) with a new (envied) pack-
age (xˆj, tˆj) = (x¯i, t¯i), keeping other components unchanged. The complete new assignment
(xˆ, tˆ) :=((x¯1, t¯1), ..., (x¯j−1, t¯j−1), (x¯i, t¯i), (x¯j+1, t¯j+1), ..., (x¯n, t¯n)) remains incentive compati-
ble, because no new packages appears in the menu and all other agents remain unaffected,
except for j. This agent j has exactly the same payoff as before: vj(xˆj)− tˆj = vj(x¯j)− t¯j, be-
cause of the envy arc (j → i), so, incentive compatibility holds: vj(xˆj)− tˆj ≥ vj(x¯k)− t¯k ∀k.
Therefore, we see that bunching procedure transforms a feasible assignment into new feasi-
ble assignment. This enables to prove Theorem 1 describing properties of SAOP equilibria.
Theorem 1.8 Assume that the cost function C(., .) is either separable with fixed
cost, or differentiable and concave w.r.t. x.9 Then (A): At any equilibrium (x¯, t¯), higher
nodes in the solution graph G¯(x¯, t¯) bring weakly higher per-package profit than lower nodes
(successors) in the sense: (j → ...i) ⇒ p¯ij(x¯, t¯) ≥ p¯ii(x¯, t¯) for separable case, or p¯ij(x¯, t¯) ≥
p¯ii(x¯, t¯) for concave case.
(B): Any optimal solution (x¯, t¯) can be simplified using a bunching procedure to get
another optimal solution (xˆ, tˆ), where: (i) different packages bring different profit;
7 Firstly, in both definitions, as well as in Theorem 1, variable xi may be multidimensional.
For this case, the derivative in the definition of p¯i must be replaced by the gradient. Second,
the definition should use more rigrous notation p¯iix¯(x, t, ), because the point x¯ of linearization is
essential. Hopefully this will not result in any confusion below.
8 Compare with Guesnerie and Seade (1982), Brito et al. (1990), and Andersson (2005). Our
novelties or enforcements are: (1)more general costs, (2)profit monotonicity statement for the
entire graph, (3)no-splitting claim, and (4)claim that each solution can be simplified by bunching
(that can be quite important in optimal-taxation setting).
9 Concavity or non-decreasing returns to scale are essential. The differentiability assumption
can be dropped, but at the expense of more cunbersome linearization in the definition of profit
per-package.
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(ii) higher position in the solution graph relates to strictly higher profit, and (iii) there are
no type-splitting and cycles.10
Proof. (A). When costs are separable, suppose the contrary to (A) for any couple of
adjacent nodes, i.e, suppose a profit-ascending arc (j → i) : p¯ii = t¯i−ci(x¯i) > p¯ij = t¯j−c(x¯j).
Then bunching j to i, as suggested in the above procedure, necessarily increases total profit
(p¯i(xˆ, tˆ) > p¯i(x¯, t¯)), and it was shown above to generate a feasible assignment (xˆ, tˆ). So, the
solution (x¯, t¯) was not optimal, resulting in a contradiction. This proves (A) for (j → i).
Similar logic applies under non-separable concave cost for any couple (j → i) assumed
to contradict (A): we can construct an improvement p¯i(xˆ, tˆ) > p¯i(x¯, t¯). What remains is to
compare artificial linearized profit p¯i with real profit pi. By construction of p¯i(.), these two
functions coincide at the point of linearization p¯i(x¯, t¯) = pi(x¯, t¯). By concavity, artificial
costs are everywhere weakly higher than real costs:
∑n
i=1mi(c0 + c¯ixˆi) ≥ C(m, xˆ), so the
real profit is higher than the artificial one, yielding pi(xˆ, tˆ) ≥ p¯i(xˆ, tˆ) > p¯i(x¯, t¯). This again
contradicts the optimality of (x¯, t¯) and proves (A) for (j → i).
By induction, the proved claim (A) can be extended from any adjacent couple to any
couple (j, i) of graph-comparable nodes.
(B). To prove (i), it is sufficient to apply the bunching procedure to eliminate all same-
profit nodes. Due to feasibility of bunching procedure, we thus get an optimal solution
(xˆ, tˆ). So, the statements (ii) and (iii) follow. Q.E.D.
Simply speaking, the theorem states that whenever the principal has separable or/and
concave costs (i.e., cost defined per-agent or increasing returns), she may confidently use
the SAOP method to design the most profitable package-pricing scheme, without any ar-
tificial partitioning, rationing and other special cautions against envy-cycles shown in the
examples. Thereby, “stock” tool is also unneeded under concave or separable cost.
10 Absence of cycle is to be understood here as absence of almost-envy cycles among distinct
package-nodes, whereas mutual almost-envy cycle among agents bunched together with the same
package is inevitable. No type-splitting means that agents with the same utilities take the same
package, even when they are formally represented by different “types” in the model.
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5 Conclusions
For discrete consumer-types screening, when cost function reflects capacity constraints
or/and standardization, there are examples showing overall distortion of equilibria, result-
ing from envy-cycles. Thus, under non-separable, non-concave cost, the examples demon-
strate that the standard screening model (SAOP) may work inadequately. It is true that
this observation raises more questions than it answers. But, we do give some guidelines
(e.g., stock variables and partitioning) for incorporating situations with capacity constraints
and/or standardization into the screening model, and bring these important issues for fu-
ture analyses in screening theory. In addition to raising these questions, the realm of
situations where SAOP works adequately is extended (by including separable and concave
costs), approaching thereby the necessary-and-sufficient conditions for adequacy of using
SAOP.
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Figure 1: Generic inefficient cycle under convex cost.
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